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The level of insolvencies in the construction industry is high, when compared to other 
industry sectors.  Given the management expertise and experience that is available to 
the construction industry, it seems strange that, according to the literature, the major 
causes of failure are lack of financial control and poor management.  This indicates 
that with a good cash flow management, companies could be kept operating and 
financially healthy.  It is possible to prevent failure.  Although there are financial 
models that can be used to predict failure, they are based on company accounts, which 
have been shown to be an unreliable source of data.  There are models available for 
cash flow management and forecasting and these could be used as a starting point for 
managers in rethinking their cash flow management practices.  The research reported 
here has reached the stage of formulating researchable questions for an in-depth study 
including issues such as how contractors manage their cash flow, how payment 
practices can be managed without damaging others in the supply chain and the 
relationships between companies’ financial structures and the payment regimes to 
which they are subjected.  
Keywords: cash flow management, company survival, company failure, financial 
control.  
INTRODUCTION 
The level of insolvency in the construction industry is high, when compared to other 
sectors.  Failure is undesirable and avoidable and it can be prevented by good cash 
flow management.   Indeed, company failure has been widely researched.  Knowledge 
about business failure can be useful in providing guidance to entrepreneurs who want 
to start a business.  It indicates the risk factors in their industry and provides the 
benefit of experience in risk management (Arditi, Koksal and Kale 2000).  
Since the 1970s, many researchers have applied financial models (such as the Z-score 
model) to predict failure.  Financial ratios, however, reveal only the symptoms, rather 
than the causes of failure (Argenti 1976).  There is some confusion between causes 
and symptoms of failure, but Argenti (1976) and Slatter (1984) highlight important 
aspects of the distinction and cite the most important causes and symptoms. 
The literature shows that apart from poor management, lack of adequate financial 
control is the most common characteristic of declining firms (Slatter 1984).   In 
construction, failure studies have focused on explaining failure at the project level, 
rather than the company level, where there has been comparatively little work (Arditi, 
Koksal and Kale 2000).  
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Several authors have investigated the causes of failure (Argenti 1976, Slatter 1984, 
Lowe 1997, Arditi, Koksal and Kale 2000).  Their results show that cash flow 
problems and poor management are the main causes.  It is known that the levels of 
insolvency in construction are high (Hughes, Hillebrandt and Murdoch 1998).  It 
ought to be possible to reduce these levels, since the major causes are known.  
Therefore, research on how to avoid the causes should be encouraged.  In other words, 
the most important step to take is to help construction companies to develop good cash 
flow management practices. 
COMPANY FAILURE 
Rates of failure 
The number and rate of business failures in the UK is perhaps the highest in the world, 
especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when there were relatively tight monetary 
policy and recession.  Altman (1984) presented statistical data on failure rate in the 
UK and in the USA from 1971 to 1980.  The data show that the UK had averaged 
0.76%, over twice that of the USA (0.35%).  Based on earlier comparisons, this was 
significantly higher than Japan, West Germany and Australia. 
Lowe (1997) presented insolvency statistics for England and Wales from 1969 to 
1995, and gave numbers for companies in receivership (company liquidations), and 
numbers for individual bankruptcy (receiving orders).  Industries were aggregated into 
six broad categories (agriculture and horticulture; manufacturing; construction; 
distribution, transports and communication; other industries; services).  These 
statistics show that insolvency in construction is not far below that registered in the 
much larger manufacturing and distribution sectors, a point also made by Hughes, 
Hillebrandt and Murdoch (1998).  
Age and size: influence upon failure 
Some studies on company failure investigated different patterns of behaviour, such as 
the influence of company size and age on the incidence of failure.  
Argenti (1976) showed statistics on failure in the USA, until 1976. The data showed 
that 2% of failed companies were one year old, more than 50% were less than 5 years 
old, and about 20% were more than 10 years old.  Knight (1979) analysed records of a 
large number of small business failures and conducted interviews with the key 
personnel involved.  He found that a firm usually fails early in its life (50% of all 
failed firms do so within 4 years and 70% within 6 years) and that managerial 
incompetence is the major cause.  Kale and Arditi (1999) developed a study of the 
influence of age on business failures.  They found an age-dependent business failure 
pattern in the USA construction industry.  The risk of failure increases initially with 
increasing age, reaches a peak point and decreases, as companies grow older.  The 
lack of organizational learning and lack of legitimacy, characteristic of new firms, 
explains this pattern.  
According to Altman (1984), in Japan bankruptcies are concentrated in the small and 
medium-sized firms.  Lowe (1997) argues that, when the case is fluctuating demand, 
the larger general builders and civil engineering contractors, and the speculative 
specialists are less prone to insolvency.  Insolvency, with a few exceptions, appears to 
affect the smaller contractors and subcontractors.  One of the reasons for this pattern, 
according to Arditi, Koksal and Kale (2000), is that large firms have an accounting 
department that publishes financial reports on a regular basis and, therefore, financial 
 Cash flow management 
25 
ratios are easier to monitor whereas small firms hire private accountants.  
Furthermore, because of the dominance of the chief executive in small firms, financial 
data may be more easily manipulated. 
By contrast, the analysis by Hughes, Hillebrandt and Murdoch (1998) of data from 
Dun and Bradstreet showed no relationship between insolvency and size of company, 
type of business, age of firm or region. 
Insolvency in construction 
The distribution of company liquidations between industries is probably mainly due to 
the numbers of firms in each industry and differences in their degrees of risk. These 
factors could be responsible for the high proportion of liquidations in the construction 
industry (Department of Trade 1975). 
Of all company liquidations and receiving orders for the self-employed, the 
construction industry accounts for a very big percentage.  In the case of self-
employed, over the past 25 years, the share of bankruptcy in the construction industry 
varied from 21% to 30%.  Similarly for company liquidations, over the same period, 
construction varied from 12% to 22% (Lowe 1997).  The construction industry is 
responsible for between 5% and 7.5% of Gross Domestic Product.   Data from Dun 
and Bradstreet show that 7% of construction companies went out of business between 
1994 and 1997 (Hughes, Hillebrandt and Murdoch 1998). 
The absolute level of insolvency in the construction industry is high.  Analysing the 
period from 1984 to 1995, it can be seen that the lowest annual insolvency figure was 
1471 companies at the peak of the boom but over three times that number in 1992 
(Hughes, Hillebrandt and Murdoch 1998).  The percentage of construction 
insolvencies in comparison to total insolvencies was over 13% in the late 1980s.  It 
was 17% in 1994.  If we compare construction insolvencies with total of companies in 
the industry, it can be said that in good times construction insolvencies are about 
12.5% above the general level but in bad times may be about 60% higher.  One of the 
reasons that construction has a large number of insolvencies is that it has a large 
number of companies (Hughes, Hillebrandt and Murdoch 1998).  In fact, the more 
firms involved in a particular sector, the greater the likelihood of high failure rates 
Lowe (1997).  
CAUSES, SYMPTOMS AND PREDICTION OF FAILURE 
Causes and symptoms  
Slatter (1984) makes a clear distinction between causes and symptoms of failure. He 
describes symptoms as danger signals, which indicate what might be wrong with the 
firm.  Symptoms, however, do not provide a guideline for management action. 
Failure is the outcome of a complex process and it is rarely dependent on a single 
factor (Arditi, Koksal and Kale 2000).  In a study of forty UK turnaround situations, 
Slatter (1984) identified the principal causes of corporate decline.  The factors 
identified are similar to the factors identified by Argenti (1976).  For these two 
authors, lack of financial control or accounting information figure as one of the major 
causes of failure, after inadequate management.  Lack of financial control means the 
absence of inadequate application of one of the following: cash flow forecasts; costing 
systems; budgetary control. There are still many smaller firms in which all of them are 
absent (Slatter 1984). 
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Argenti (1976), in summarizing the work of several authors and professionals, 
identified a big variety in opinions, and big differences in the lists of causes.  Among 
the most highlighted were poor understanding of cash flow and lack of capital.  Poor 
financial management is also viewed as a significant cause of failure by Boussabaine 
and Kaka (1998) and by Kenley (1999). 
In the context of the construction industry the failure of a firm may be considered to 
be dependent on the failure of one or more of its projects.  It is difficult, however to 
determine both the critical success and the failure factors in projects (e.g. Russell and 
Jaselskis 1992, Bellasi and Tukel 1996). 
Some authors described the financial values as symptoms, rather than causes of failure 
(Argenti 1976, Slatter 1984).  ‘Financial ratios may not be very reliable because of the 
‘creative accounting’ practices used by a failing company’s management when 
attempting to hide the poor financial condition of the company from outside investors 
and creditors’ (Argenti 1976).  Symptoms of failure, for Slatter (1984) are easier to 
detect than the causes.  He describes the financial indicators as the most commonly 
used symptoms, although there are also non-financial factors, which are taken in 
account by bankers, receivers and consultants.  
Prediction 
A number of attempts have been made to predict company failure based on financial 
ratios.  The first attempt to predict bankruptcy was made by Beaver (1966). He used 
seventy-nine failed firms and seventy-nine non-failed firms of the same asset size in 
the same industry, and calculated six ratios for each firm for a one-year period.  He 
found that not all ratios predicted equally well and that cash flow to total debt was the 
best predictor.  Altman (1968) generated a Z-score discriminate model, and Edminster 
(1972) used multiple discriminant analysis to predict the failure of business.  Knight 
(1979) also attempted to classify failure using a discriminant analysis model.  He 
concluded that the discriminant analysis procedure was not successful.  A form of 
linear discriminant analysis has also been used on UK data for the period from1972 to 
1978 at the London Business School, with the result that cash flow to total debt 
(Beaver’s best predictor) and the number of negative cash flow periods in the last 
seven years proved to be the most reliable predictors of problem firms (Slatter 1984).  
Until the work of  Storey et al.. (1989), the prediction literature was almost entirely 
based on data relating to large firms (an exception being Edminster 1972). 
CASH FLOW: A MAJOR ISSUE 
In recent years, in Britain, around 250,000 new businesses have been created every 
year.  Many are destined to fail within the first two years.  One key reason is the lack 
of a viable business plan for their operation (Cole 1997).  Argenti’s research (1976) 
identified four main deficiencies that are characteristic of failed companies: cash flow 
forecasts, costing system, budgetary control, and asset valuation.  Cash flow problems 
and shortage of working capital can, in extreme circumstances, push efficient and 
profitable firms into insolvency.  It is also possible that a firm is pulled into 
insolvency by the failure of another firm.  This “domino theory” may apply if a client 
becomes insolvent owing large sums of money to the contractor, or if a main 
contractor fails owing cash to one or more regular subcontractors (Lowe 1997).  
Arditi, Koksal and Kale (2000) explored the factors associated with company failures 
in the USA construction industry.  They populated an environment/response matrix 
with Dun & Bradstreet’s USA business failure data for the construction industry (for 
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the period from 1989 to 1993).  Table 1 shows the calculation of weighted average 
values of failure factors.  The findings indicate that budgetary and macroeconomic 
issues represent 83% of the reasons for construction company failures.  On the other 
hand, issues of adaptability to market conditions and business issues appear to have 
limited effects on company survivability (6% of the reasons for failure).  According to 
Arditi, Koksal and Kale (2000), budgetary issues can be handled by companies that 
are cognizant of the effects of these factors on their survivability.  Budgetary and 
macroeconomic issues include the cash flow related items. 
 
Failure factors Weighted % occurrence 
Budgetary issues 
Human/organization capital issues 
Issues of adaptation to market conditions 
Business issues 
Macroeconomic issues 
Natural factors 
Total 
60 (cash flow factors) 
8 
3 
4 
23 (cash flow factors) 
3 
100  
 
Lowe (1997) identified the most important causal factors through a multiple 
regression model of construction insolvency in the UK.  Six broad areas were 
identified by the general literature review and the analysis of the construction sector: 
profitability (return on capital invested); cash flow (working capital requirements, 
borrowing, domino theory); credit (cost of credit, availability of credit); fluctuating 
demand (changes in demand); competitive tendering (tendering and pricing 
strategies); management problems.  The first four areas were tested, but it was not 
possible to test the last two from the statistics he had available.  Cash flow related 
variables were found to have a big impact on construction insolvency.  Higher 
requirements for both, working capital and borrowing, as well as lagged general 
insolvency were found to have the effect of increasing insolvency.  For the other 
tested variables it was shown that higher profitability leads to lower levels of 
insolvency.  Higher interest rates and tighter monetary policy have the effect of 
reducing construction insolvency.  Also, the greater the fluctuation in construction 
output, the lower construction insolvency will become. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH FLOW MANAGEMENT  
Management 
The study of construction project cash flow became increasingly popular in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Kenley and Wilson 1986).  While the importance of financial or cash flow 
management is normally discussed with reference to the company level, most of the 
models for cash flow forecasting are individually developed for specific project types 
(Navon 1995). 
Some developments applied logit transformation regression procedures in attempts to 
understand cash flow (Kenley 1986, Kenley and Wilson 1986, 1989).  Kenley and 
Wilson (1986) concluded that forecasts of individual cash flows are invalid when 
derived from analysis of grouped data.  Kenley (1986) investigated the cumulative 
gross cash flow profiles (S curves) and the cumulative net cash flow profiles of 
construction project cash flows. Kenley and Wilson (1989) proposed a construction 
project net cash flow model to provide a measure of a project’s net cash flow trend 
Table 1: Calculation of weighted average values of failure factors (Arditi, Koksal and Kale 2000). 
Mutti and Hughes 
28 
over time.  In further developments, a stochastic model was used to simulate the levels 
of working capital available within a building firm, utilizing specific techniques for 
the management of cash flow on a large and systematic scale (Kenley 1999).  He 
concluded that careful management of cash flow through operations can yield a 
significant contribution to working capital. 
Forecast 
There are numerous techniques for cash flow forecasting, differing in their levels of 
accuracy and detail, the degree of automation in compiling them, the method they use 
to integrate the time and the money elements, etc.  Some of the techniques are 
probabilistic, but most are deterministic (Navon 1995).  The majority of models 
developed to assist in cash flow forecasts have been based on standard cost flow S-
curves, developed using past construction projects (Boussabaine and Kaka 1998, 
Boussabaine and Elhag 1999).  The accuracy of a cash flow forecast generated from 
standard cost curves depends on whether the adopted S-curve accurately represents 
the project to be constructed (Boussabaine and Kaka 1998). 
Kaka and Price (1991) tested the reliability of a net cash flow model based on cost 
commitment curves. Skitmore (1992) attempted to predict the best parameter values of 
the models for cash flow forecasting.  Navon (1995) discussed different approaches 
and models for project level cash flow forecasting.  Kaka (1996) demonstrated that by 
merging further variables, the flexibility and reliability of cash flow forecasting are 
enhanced.  Boussabaine and Kaka (1998) investigated the feasibility of using neural 
networks to predict the cost flow of construction projects. Boussabaine and Elhag 
(1999) presented an alternative approach to cash flow analysis for construction 
projects (fuzzy cash flow analysis).  These developments prove the importance of cash 
flow forecasting, and show that companies should pay more attention to this issue. 
PROBLEMS WITH RATIO ANALYSIS 
When observing failing companies, financial ratios, while widely used, may not be 
very reliable. Creative accounting practices are used by managers when attempting to 
hide the poor financial condition of the company from outside investors and creditors 
(Argenti 1976).  Even under normal operating conditions, ratio analysis can be 
problematic, and not transparent enough.  An important point is that company 
accounts are at least a year old and subject to revision.  Sometimes, figures can be 
mistaken, as occurred recently in the UK with Morgan Sindall plc and Amey plc. 
These companies’ accounts problems were announced by the Construction News 
(2002) and Financial Times (2002a, 2002b, 2002c).  This kind of incident only adds to 
the negative image that construction firms have with City analysts. 
Amey Plc 
Support services group Amey unveiled unexpected accounting changes that turned an 
underlying profit of £55m into a pre-tax loss of £18.3m. The shift took the market by 
surprise and Amey’s share values fell. The group said it has changed its accounting 
policy to reflect a shift in its strategic focus towards bidding for major contracts and 
will more fully recognise the costs involved (Construction News 2002, Financial 
Times 2002a).  These account changes, however, do not impress the City analysts, 
who said that accounting changes could have implications for the way other groups 
involved in private finance initiative and public private partnership projects account 
for bid costs. Amey is now setting a benchmark, which is way beyond what anyone 
else has ever imagined (Financial Times 2002a). 
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Amey has applied the strictest interpretation to draft rules on contract accounting from 
a UK Accounting Standards Board task force. Principle one is to write off bidding 
costs for contracts when they occur, rather than capitalising them. The surprise was 
that Amey had so much on its balance sheet. Principle two is to defer recognising fee 
income from government-related private finance initiative contracts until projects are 
up and running. The effect is to shift profits from the past to the future (Financial 
Times 2002c). As it happened, Amey did not loose its credibility. It continues to be 
awarded with contracts and its share price is up again. 
Morgan Sindall 
Morgan Sindall also mistook figures.  It had overestimated revenues from its regional 
construction business. John Morgan, Morgan Sindall’s co-founder and executive 
chairman said that future revenue from contracts was overestimated at three of the 25 
regional offices.  They were unaware of these problems.  £4m of the change in profit 
estimate arose from 15 contracts, although he declined to give details on how such a 
large overestimate has been made.  Shares in Morgan Sindall fell 23% after that  
(Financial Times 2002b). 
Some time before (20 days) their published annual turnover had reached £99m in 
2001, as a result of its string of acquisitions. The estimate turnover from 2002 was 
£1bn.  They showed their annual results (12 months to 31/12/01) having a turnover of 
£909m, and a pre-tax profit of £21m. Their segmental analysis has shown high 
turnover and profit from 2001 and 2002 (Contract Journal 2002).   
CASH FLOW AND PAYMENT SYSTEM 
It is clearly important to have a clear picture of a company’s cash flow position.  It is 
easy to mistake financial ratios, and common not to have control over the cash flow in 
a company.  The discussion so far has shown the importance of cash flow. There are 
many aspects that have to be analysed carefully when dealing with company cash 
flow.  Given the contribution to their working capital, the key issue for contractors is 
to hold the maximum amount of money for the maximum period of time.  
Contractors usually sub-contract labour, plant, equipment and services as a way to 
avoid the investment of capital on it. The main objective of a contractor is to recover a 
specific amount of money within a specific period (Tah, Thorpe and Mccaffer 1994). 
They need return for the capital invested.  Sub-contracting is often used as a technique 
to create longer payment periods.  If the company has its own workforce they need the 
money available to pay the workforce weekly.  In contrast, if the company makes use 
of sub-contractors, the money can be held for much longer, awaiting a monthly 
invoice and paying one or two months after receiving it.  It should be remembered, 
however, that a contractor’s pay out is a sub-contractor’s pay in. 
When the aim is to win a contract, or to get more money for a project, overheads and 
risk margins are subject to manipulation.  The estimating of indirect costs is a 
sensitive and confidential issue for construction companies.  General overheads, risk 
margins and profits can be considered as indirect costs.  There are not specific rules 
about how to calculate site overheads.  The general overhead amount is generally 
determined by expressing the budgeted annual overheads as a percentage of budgeted 
turnovers and applied as a proportion of the cost of individual contracts.  If the 
company is competing satisfactorily, the overheads percentage can be kept as it is.  It 
may be reduced to win the contract, or may be increased if failure to win the contract 
will not affect the company (Tah, Thorpe and Mccaffer 1994).  Risks can be 
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quantifiable and unquantifiable.  For quantifiable risks, the appropriate costs are 
included.  The costs depend on what is exposed to risk.  For unquantifiable risks, the 
amount added is based on the management perception of the situation (Tah, Thorpe 
and Mccaffer 1994). 
Sometimes, contractors overvalue the initial phases of their projects, so that they can 
have more money at the beginning of the project (referred to as “front-loading” the 
rates or bills).  But to keep the overall value of the project unaltered, the final stages 
are undervalued.  In order to get sufficient money to finish the contract, they have to 
get another contract.  The cycle is repeated: overestimate the initial phases, to have 
more money, to use for completion of the former project.  This might not be a serious 
problem in cases in which the company is operating and growing constantly.  It may, 
however, be a serious problem if the company doesn’t get another project soon. The 
payment systems, in this case would have to be very flexible. 
The UK’s Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 regulates the way 
that construction contract payments should be made. The existence of the law is, by 
itself, evidence that the practice of manipulating payments is widespread and 
unacceptable.  The fact that the financial structures of construction companies are so 
dependant on the characteristic cash flow patterns indicates a need to understand 
better the relationship between financial structures and payment regimes. 
What are the techniques available for manipulating cash?  Is there any correlation 
between the amount of subcontractors and the flexibility of payments?  To what extent 
can contractors borrow based on their project contract cash flows? This paper forms 
the theoretical basis for research that is in the initial phase. The research will seek to 
answer these questions. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The research will be based on an international survey of payment and cash flow in 
contracting firms.  Initially, interviews will be conducted with contractors, sub-
contractors and consultants in the UK, Italy, Portugal and Brazil.  
The purpose of these interviews is to provide sufficient information for the design of a 
questionnaire survey (sampling) that will use sampling techniques to discover trends 
and patterns.  Some of the issues to be covered on the interviews regard the nature of 
the business, annual turnover, extension of subcontracting, usual procurement 
methods. It will also include questions about financial control, and how (if any) it is 
developed within the company. The way payment systems work in different countries 
will be, initially the main focus of the interviews (certification period, retention, and 
payment after final completion). 
The interview questions are designed to get qualitative answers.  Responses should be 
recorded so that, in designing the questionnaire survey, the difficulty of explaining or 
recalling certain kinds of information can be taken into account.  The interviews will 
also help to reveal the diversity of responses to these issues, so that, where 
appropriate, lists of options can be used in the questionnaire survey.  The recordings 
will be studied also for linguistic difficulties and differences, so ensure that the 
questions have similar meanings and relevance in a variety of different countries and 
languages.  The questionnaire will be applied to contractors in different countries. The 
results will be analysed and compared, to form an overall picture of payment systems 
and cash flow management in construction. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Construction represents a big share of the industry.  It also presents high levels of 
insolvency.  Failure, for this sector, is a serious problem.  Most of the failure, 
however, can be avoided.  For this to be possible, the causes have to be known.  And 
the major ones are already known.  The major causes of failure are poor management 
and bad cash flow management.  From the evidence of the impact of cash flow on 
failure, it is clear that the causes of failure, even when they are known, do not appear 
to be taken seriously.  They must be if a company is to survive.  
Existing developments and methods in cash flow forecasting and modelling can serve 
as a starting point for managers to rethink their cash flow management.  A detailed 
study of various construction companies, in terms of how cash flow is managed in 
each of their projects, would provide interesting lessons about what constitutes 
financial health for a construction company.  
The examples of retrospective revisions to company accounts are a serious challenge 
to current views on companies accounting practices and cash flow control. These 
cases show how ratio analysis can be problematic, and not sufficiently transparent.  
The issue of cash flow raises questions about how a company could deal with it.  If 
company survival is to do with cash flow, a contractor should be able to manipulate 
the payouts, in order to hold more money for longer.  However, it is clear that this way 
of raising working capital only passes bigger problems down the supply chain.   
This apparent need of a better understanding of the relation of financial structure and 
payment regimes is what motivates the research, which will follow this paper. Further 
progress and results will be reported at the conference, and in further papers. 
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